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Note
To Be or Not To Be? The Actual Innocence Exception
in Noncapital Sentencing Cases
James J. Sticha*
Missouri inmate Jack Higgins petitioned for federal habeas
corpus review' alleging that the sentencing court failed to apply
an amendment to Missouri's drug laws that reduced the
maximum possible sentence for his crime.2 While acknowledg-
ing that the sentencing court made a mistake,3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied review of
Higgins' claim because he failed to raise the issue in the state
trial court, on state appeal, or in an application for state post-
conviction relief.4 Higgins' failure to follow the applicable state
procedural rules in raising the claim constituted a procedural
default,5 which federal habeas courts normally will not review.6
Previously, in Jones v. Arkansas,7 the Eighth Circuit
excused a federal habeas petitioner's procedural default by
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; BA 1994,
University of St. Thomas.
1. The writ of habeas corpus is a form of collateral attack in which a court
determines whether a prisoner is unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1991) [hereinafter BLAcK'S]. Title 28
U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant the writ of habeas corpus and
provides that "[tihe writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless
... [hie is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
2. Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1993).
3. Id. at 441. District Judge Floyd Gibson noted in dissent that "nobody
has seriously contended that the correct statute was used to sentence Higgins."
Id. at 442 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 441. Generally, a reviewing court will refuse to consider issues
not raised in a lower court. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941).
5. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992) (stating that
procedurally defaulted claims occur when petitioners fail to follow state
procedural rules in raising claims).
6. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982) (noting that
procedural defaults bar federal habeas review unless the petitioner shows cause
and actual prejudice).
7. 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991).
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invoking the actual innocence exception.' This exception allows
a federal habeas court to excuse a procedural default to correct
a fundamentally unjust incarceration.9 In Jones the state trial
court sentenced the defendant under the wrong statute." The
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, noting that it is
difficult to think of a person more innocent of a sentence than a
defendant sentenced under an inapplicable statute." The same
appellate court, however, refused to apply the actual innocence
exception in Higgins' case despite recognizing that he received
a sentence exceeding the maximum permitted by state law.'2
The apparent inconsistency of these two cases 3 exemplifies the
problems that courts experience in applying the actual innocence
exception to noncapital sentencing cases.
The actual innocence exception emerged in cases where
federal habeas petitioners asserted that the wrong person was
convicted of the crime.'4 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
extended the actual innocence exception to capital sentencing
cases, but recognized that the exception did not translate easily
8. Id. at 381.
9. Id. (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)). The trial court
in Jones found that the defendant had two valid previous convictions and
sentenced the defendant under an amended version of the state's habitual
offender statute. 929 F.2d at 377. The habitual offender statute applicable at
the time of defendant's offense, however, required more than two previous
felony convictions. Id. at 378. On federal habeas corpus appeal, the Eighth
Circuit invoked the actual innocence exception to hear the defendant's claim
that his sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Id. at
380. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
10. Id. at 378 (noting that the state conceded it had used the wrong
statute).
11. Id. at 381.
12. Higgins argued that his case required application of the Jones principle
that a person sentenced under an inapplicable statute is actually innocent of
the sentence. Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1993).
13. Several facts in Higgins differed from the facts of Jones. First, the
decision in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), may have overruled Jones.
See Higgins, 991 F.2d at 441 (noting that Jones may no longer be "good law" in
the context of a noncapital case). Second, Higgins did not allege a constitutional
violation. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (noting that the
claim of actual innocence requires a showing of a constitutional violation).
Finally, the Jones court relied on the bifurcated nature of the trial in extending
the actual innocence exception. See Jones, 929 F.2d at 381 n.16 (stating that
the trial-like proceedings in the habitual offender sentencing case resembled
capital sentencing proceedings). But see United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888
(4th Cir. 1994) (applying the actual innocence exception in a post-Sawyer case
without relying on a constitutional violation or a bifurcated trial).
14. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 340.
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into the context of sentencing because it requires characterizing
a defendant as innocent of a death sentence rather than innocent
of the underlying crime.'" The Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether a defendant can be "innocent" of a noncapital sen-
tence.'"
This Note argues that the actual innocence exception should
extend to certain noncapital sentencing cases, but that the
exception's narrow scope requires an extremely limited exten-
sion. Part I reviews the history of habeas corpus law and
examines the actual innocence exception and its extension to
capital sentencing proceedings. Part II discusses the actual
innocence exception in the context of noncapital sentencing
proceedings. Part III analyzes the debate over the extension of
the actual innocence exception to noncapital sentences, delin-
eates the proper scope of review in noncapital sentencing cases,
and discusses the ramifications of extending the actual innocence
exception to these cases. This Note concludes that the benefits
associated with narrowly extending the exception to certain
noncapital sentencing cases outweigh the added administrative
burdens.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTUAL
INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
A. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus provides a post-conviction
procedure which enables prisoners to challenge the legal
authority under which they are detained. 7 Known as the
"Great Writ," 8 the writ of habeas corpus holds an honored
position in American jurisprudence because it redresses denials
of due process 9 and acts as a "bulwark against convictions that
15. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986) (discussing the distinct
concepts of actual versus legal innocence).
16. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 1995).
17. See BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 709 (stating that "[t]he primary function
of the writ is to release from unlawful imprisonment"); see also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements of habeas corpus).
18. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (describing
the writ of habeas corpus as the "great writ").
19. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (discussing the writ's role in
vindicating due process violations); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
363 (1966) (granting relief because excessive publicity overcame the defendant's
trial, violating due process); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923)
(finding that a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict from
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violate fundamental fairness."" The framers of the Constitu-
tion included the writ in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution,
assuring that the "Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspend-
ed, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered
federal courts to grant the writ as a remedy for prisoners held
in the federal government's custody.22 In 1867, Congress
extended the scope of federal habeas corpus to include prisoners
held in a state's custody by authorizing federal courts to grant
the writ in all cases in which a person is incarcerated in
violation of the Constitution." With the exception of the
Fourth Amendment,' the writ today extends to virtually all
constitutional claims that follow the proper procedural rules.2"
Federal habeas corpus review, however, is a controversial
and volatile issue." The large number of frivolous habeas
proceedings dominated by a mob violated constitutional rights of those
convicted).
20. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
21. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).
23. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991) (discussing the
expansion of federal habeas corpus law and noting the extension of the writ to
state prisoners).
24. State prisoners alleging a Fourth Amendment violation are not entitled
to federal habeas review if the state provided a full and fair hearing of their
Fourth Amendment claims. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,494 (1976). Courts
have not extended the Stone rule to other constitutional violations. See
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 (1993) (refusing to apply Stone to
violations of Miranda safeguards); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979)
(refusing to extend the Stone rationale to claims of racial discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury); Ira P. Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?
Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 292 (1986)
("Justice Brennan's fear that the reasoning of [Stone] would extend beyond
exclusionary-rule claims has not been realized."). Justice Black explained the
reasoning for differential treatment Fourth Amendment claims receive on
federal habeas review:
A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is
crucially different from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the
evidence seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by
the means of its seizure and indeed often this evidence alone establish-
es beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
25. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 364 (5th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS] (acknowledging that constitutional
violations entitle prisoners to relief unless violations are harmless).
26. Id. at 366 ("Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is, and always has
been, a controversial and emotional-ridden subject.").
1996] ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION 1619
corpus petitions places a heavy burden on federal courts. In
addition, state courts resent a single federal judge reviewing
decisions considered by every level of the state's judicial
process.2" The principles of comity29 and finality"° require
federal courts to carefully examine the proper scope of federal
habeas corpus law because extending federal habeas review
increases costs to society, the accused, the judicial system, and
our federal system.3
27. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (stating that "floods of
stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts
and swell our own"); 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4261, at 269 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that federal judges resent the
large number of frivolous federal habeas petitions filed). In 1992, the number
of federal habeas petitions filed exceeded 12,000, and the writ was granted in
at most, four percent of the cases. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note
25, at 366-67 (discussing the great number of applications for habeas corpus).
But see Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a
Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1043-44 (1993) (stating that habeas
petitions from state prisoners place a small burden on federal courts when
compared to the burdens produced by diversity cases).
28. A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies before a
federal court will entertain an application for habeas review. Ex Parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1886). Congress codified this requirement in 1948, and
it now appears at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994). For a thorough discussion of the
exhaustion doctrine, see Matthew L. Anderson, Note, Requiring Unwanted
Habeas Corpus Petitions to State Supreme Courts for Exhaustion Purposes: Too
Exhausting, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1197 (1995).
29. Comity, in this context, refers to federal courts giving effect to the
judicial decisions of state courts out of respect and deference to the state courts.
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 267.
30. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 149 (1970) (noting the desire for
litigation to come to an end).
31. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982) ("[Tlhe Great Writ
imposes special costs on our federal system. ... Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders
and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
conceding the possibility of error in all trials undermines the stability and
effectiveness of the judicial system); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that both criminal defendants and society
have an interest in seeing litigation come to an end because then attention can
be focused on rehabilitation).
The costs of federal habeas review continually prompt proposals for
legislation restricting its scope. See Lay, supra note 27, at 1021-22 ("Over the
past few years, proponents of new limitations to habeas corpus have continued
to pursue their agenda with proposals to the Congress."). These proposals
garner growing support among those believing the costs of federal habeas
review outweigh the benefits. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 25, at
367 (discussing the growing call for a modification of the writ's scope).
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B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CAUSE AND PREJUDICE STANDARD
FOR SUCCESSIVE, ABUSIVE, AND PROCEDURALLY
DEFAULTED CLAIMS
Federal habeas petitioners bringing successive, abusive, or
procedurally defaulted claims have forced federal courts to
examine closely the costs and benefits of extending the scope of
habeas review to these claims.32 A successive petition raises
claims identical to those raised and rejected on the merits in a
prior federal habeas petition.33 An abusive petition raises
claims available but not relied on in a prior habeas petition.34
Procedurally defaulted claims occur when state prisoners fail to
comply with state procedural rules in raising their claims.35
Extending review to procedurally defaulted claims is particularly
troubling because it allows federal courts to hear a state claim
without the opportunity for state court review.
36
In Fay v. Noia,37 the Supreme Court liberally construed
federal courts' power to hear procedurally defaulted claims by
holding that federal habeas relief was available as long as
petitioners did not deliberately bypass state procedures. 8 The
Court limited the sweeping breadth of the Noia decision,
however, in Wainwright v. Sykes. 9 In Wainwright, the Court
rejected the deliberate bypass standard of Noia and adopted a
rule requiring federal habeas petitioners to show cause for
failing to comply with state rules that required contemporaneous
objections at trial, and to show prejudice from an alleged
constitutional error.4" The Court viewed this "cause and
32. Successive, abusive, and procedurally defaulted claims are distinct
concepts, but are treated alike under the cause and prejudice standard and
actual innocence standard. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338
(1992).
33. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445 n.6 (1986).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (stating that
petitioner's failure to timely object at his state trial constituted a procedural
default).
36. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982) (stating that reviewing
procedural defaults exact higher costs because it undercuts states' ability to
enforce procedural rules).
37. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38. See id. at 439 (stating that federal courts may deny habeas writs if
petitioners deliberately bypass state procedures).
39. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
40. Id. at 85, 87-88.
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prejudice" standard as protecting against a petitioner being a
"victim of a miscarriage of justice."4' Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court extended the cause and prejudice standard to all
state procedurally defaulted claims,42 as well as to successive
and abusive habeas petitions.43
The cause and prejudice standard evolved in the context of
procedural defaults resulting from defense attorneys' failure to
assert claims at the state level." Typically, to show cause for
a default, a petitioner must rely on an "ineffectiveness of trial
counsel" argument.45 Proving ineffective counsel, however, is
extremely difficult46 because only the most egregious and
obvious errors by counsel support a finding of ineffective
counsel. Attorney errors insufficient to render counsel
41. Id. at 90-91.
42. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991).
43. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,338 (1992) (applying the cause and
prejudice test to a successive claim); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493
(1991) (applying the cause and prejudice test to an abusive claim).
44. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
"the ordinary procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence,
inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel").
45. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CMI. L. REV. 679, 681-90
(1990) (discussing the standards used to determine whether the cause and
prejudice standard has been met, and recognizing ineffective counsel as "cause"
for procedural defaults).
46. See id. at 682 (noting that "only a small percentage of defaulted claims"
involve attorney error that is construed as ineffective counsel); Jordan Steiker,
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 335 (1993) (stating that
empirical studies confirm that few habeas petitioners have been able to show
ineffective counsel).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91 (1984). A strong
presumption exists that counsel's conduct is reasonable. Id. at 689. This
standard is extraordinarily deferential to the attorney's strategic decision-
making. Steiker, supra note 46, at 334.
In Romero v. Lynaugh, defense counsel's entire presentation at the
sentencing stage of a capital trial consisted of the following:
Defense Counsel: ... Jesse?
The Defendant: Sir?
Defense Counsel: Stand up.
You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life
in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I have to say.
884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit held that the presentation
did not amount to ineffective counsel, stating that "[hiad the jury returned a life
sentence the strategy might well have been seen as a brilliant move." Id. at
877.
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ineffective fail to satisfy the cause prong.48  The stringent
requirements for establishing ineffective counsel virtually
guarantee that petitioners will fail to satisfy the cause prong.49
The prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test is
equally difficult to satisfy. To show prejudice, a petitioner
normally must demonstrate that the alleged trial errors
substantially disadvantaged the petitioner and infected the
entire trial with constitutional error.5 ° For example, in the
typical claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner must show that
but for counsel's error, the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different.5 Without defining "'cause' and 'preju-
dice,'"52 the Supreme Court delineated stringent requirements
for its satisfaction.
C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE: AN EXCEPTION TO THE CAUSE AND
PREJUDICE STANDARD
The realization that some victims of a wrongful conviction
would fail to meet the cause and prejudice standard53 led the
Court to create a separate "miscarriage of justice," or "actual
48. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 45, at 682 (noting that attorney errors
not constituting ineffective counsel are not "cause); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-54 (1991) (holding that attorney's errors in post-
conviction proceedings cannot constitute cause because petitioners possess no
constitutional right to an attorney in post-conviction proceedings); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982) (rejecting an argument that the cause test
was satisfied when defense counsel failed to object, believing an objection was
futile). But see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 1-15 (1984) (holding that the cause
test is satisfied if a claim was so novel that it was not reasonably available to
defense counsel).
49. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the inability
of petitioners to demonstrate ineffective counsel).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169-72 (1982) (rejecting
the argument that first degree murder instructions that allegedly relieved the
government of the burden of proving malice were not prejudicial error because
petitioner presented no evidence that he acted without malice); Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (stating that an erroneous jury instruction
satisfies the prejudice prong only if it "so infect[s] the entire trial that the
resulting conviction violates due process" (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141, 147 (1973)).
51. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
52. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (refraining from
defining "'cause' and 'prejudice").
53. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (stating that the principles
of comity and finality involved in cause and prejudice analysis must yield to
correcting fundamentally unjust incarcerations).
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innocence," exception.54 This exception allows a petitioner to
gain federal habeas review of a successive, abusive, or defaulted
claim without satisfying the cause and prejudice standard.55
The actual innocence exception applies to the narrow class of
cases in which a petitioner shows that a constitutional violation
probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent person."
Invoking the concept of actual innocence helped alleviate
concerns that innocent people might be punished because of
errors in their trials.5"
Typically, a state prisoner raises an actual innocence claim
by asserting that the state wrongly convicted the prisoner of a
crime.5" A free-standing claim of actual innocence,59 however,
54. The terms "miscarriage of justice" and "actual innocence" are
synonymous. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,339 (1992) (stating that
"we elaborated on the miscarriage ofjustice, or 'actual innocence,' exception").
55. See id. at 339 ("We have previously held that even if a state prisoner
cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard, a federal court may hear the
merits of the successive claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute
a 'miscarriage of justice.'"); see also Steiker, supra note 46, at 342-43 (noting
cases holding that the miscarriage of justice exception applies to successive,
abusive, and procedurally defaulted petitions).
56. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Requiring a showing of
actual innocence conformed to the views ofjudges and commentators believing
that allowing habeas review in the absence of a showing of innocence was
illogical. See, e.g., Kaufinan v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the
kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt.");
Friendly, supra note 30, at 142 ("jWith a few important exceptions, convictions
should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence.").
57. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 866 (1995) ("[Cloncer about the
injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been
at the core of our criminal justice system."); Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as
a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 415, 421 (1991)
(noting that the thought of punishing innocent prisoners simply because they
failed to comply with state procedural rules troubled some Supreme Court
Justices, and the actual innocence exception helped alleviate the concern).
Some commentators contend that it is better to let ninety-nine guilty people go
free than to have one innocent person condemned. Cf Jon 0. Newman, Beyond
"Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (1993) (noting the differing
ratios of guilty people acquitted to innocent people convicted that courts find
acceptable).
58. See, e.g., Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854 (petitioner alleging evidence
improperly withheld at trial would establish innocence); Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 396 (1993) (petitioner arguing that newly discovered evidence
established innocence); Saahir v. Collins, 956 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1992)
(petitioner claiming that statement by codefendant exonerated him); Coleman
v. O'Leary, 845 F.2d 696, 703 (7th Cir.) (petitioner claiming secretion test would
prove him innocent of rape conviction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 972 (1988).
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does not allow a federal court to review a habeas petition. 0 A
federal habeas petitioner must also raise a constitutional claim
because "federal habeas courts sit to ensure thatindividuals are not
imprisoned inviolation of the Constitution-notto correct errors of
fact."6 A claim of actual innocence is "a gateway through which
a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered on the merits."62 The Supreme
Court recently determined that a petitioner claiming to be
innocent of a crime and raising a procedurally barred constitu-
tional violation must show that the constitutional violation
"probably resulted" in the conviction of an innocent person.63
59. A free-standing claim of actual innocence occurs when a petitioner
contends to be innocent, but does not accompany this contention with a
constitutional claim. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05.
60. Id. at 400. But see id. at 417 (assuming arguendo that "in a capital case
a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would
render the execution ... unconstitutional, and would warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim"); id. at 426
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (reserving "the question whether federal courts may
entertain convincing claims of actual innocence" absent a separate constitution-
al violation); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (stating that a truly persuasive
showing of actual innocence would render an execution unconstitutional); id. at
431-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause allow death-row petitioners to
challenge punishment on the grounds of actual innocence); see also Barry
Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 485, 509 (1995) (arguing that all nine Justices in Herrera held that an
innocent person could not be executed).
The notion that a person could be executed even though new evidence
indicated the person did not commit the crime drew large public criticism. See,
e.g., Nat Hentoff, When Guilt or Innocence 'Doesn't Matter,' WASH. POST, Feb.
13, 1993, at A31 (arguing that the Herrera decision was "[miurder by the
highest court in the land"); Lethal Expediency; U.S. Supreme Court Refuses to
Reopen Capital Punishment Cases, PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1993, at 10, 10 ("The
U.S. Supreme Court has plunged to a depth of barbarity surprising even to its
harshest critics."). But see Court's Sound Legal Reasoning, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Jan. 27, 1993, at A12 (arguing that the decision in Herrera was the product of
sound legal reasoning).
In Herrera, the majority largely relied on the fact that the petitioner could
gain relief through the state's (Texas) procedure of executive clemency. Herrera
at 416-17. But see Steiker, supra note 46, at 386 (stating that "executive
clemency procedures are not tailored to vindicate inmates' claims based on
newly discovered evidence").
61. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400. Alleging a constitutional violation normally
poses few problems because "it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve
a 'constitutional' claim." Friendly, supra note 30, at 156 (emphasis in original).
62. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
63. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995) (citing the "Carrier
standard"). In Murray v. Carrier, the Court held that the miscarriage ofjustice
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H. APPLYING THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
AT SENTENCING
A. THE EXTENSION OF THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION TO
CAPITAL SENTENCING CASES
On the same day the Supreme Court formulated the actual
innocence exception in Kuhlmann v. Wilson" and Murray v.
Carrier,5 it acknowledged in Smith v. Murrays" that the
exception applies to capital sentencing proceedings.6 7 The
Court noted that although the concept of actual innocence did
not translate easily into the context of capital sentences,6 8 a
petitioner could be innocent of a capital sentence.69
At first glance, the extension of the actual innocence
exception to capital cases appears rooted in the belief that the
exception applies "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent." 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that to show actual innocence of a
capital sentence, "one must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law." Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). In Schiup, the Court limited the Sawyer
standard to capital sentencing cases and endorsed the Carrier standard for
claims of actual innocence of a crime. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 866-67.
64. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
65. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
66. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
67. Id. at 537. At the sentencing stage of petitioner's capital trial,
psychiatric testimony describing his past sexual deviance was admitted over
defense counsel's objection. Id. at 530. On appeal from his death sentence, the
defendant's attorney did not challenge the issue of the admittance of the
psychiatric testimony. Id. at 531. Subsequent cases established that
psychiatric testimony, such as that admitted in Smith, violates a defendant's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,463,471
(1981) (psychiatric testimony admitted at the sentencing phase). In his federal
habeas appeal, the petitioner in Smith v. Murray argued that the admission of
the psychiatric evidence violated his Fifth Amendment right. Smith, 477 U.S.
at 531-32. The Supreme Court, however, held that petitioner could not show
"cause" for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Id. at 533-37. The Court
noted a willingness to apply the actual innocence exception if it would avoid a
fundamentally unjust incarceration, but did not find this to be such a case. Id.
at 537-38.
68. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 ("We acknowledge that the concept of 'actual,'
as distinct from 'legal,' innocence does not translate easily into the context of
an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense."); see
also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) (stating that "[tihe phrase
'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of those words").
69. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496).
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finality of the death penalty mandates increased reliability in
capital sentencing. ° The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require the sentencing authority to possess sufficient information
on the character and individual circumstances of a defendant
before imposing a death sentence.71 Typically, the prosecution
presents aggravating circumstances associated with the crime in
arguing for the death penalty, and the defense presents mitigat-
ing factors in arguing for a life sentence. 2 This process seeks
to insure that, in light of all the individual circumstances of a
case, the sentencing authority reaches an informed decision
regarding whether the defendant should receive a sentence of
life imprisonment or death."
The Supreme Court, however, consistently has held that a
death sentence does not require a heightened standard of review
on federal habeas corpus review.74 Following this rationale,
70. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (arguing that risks
of unwarranted sentences cannot be tolerated when defendants' lives are at
stake); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that the qualitative
difference between the death penalty and other penalties is the greater degree
of reliability required when the death penalty is imposed); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two."). Noncapital sentencing cases are different because various post-
conviction remedies, such as probation, parole, and work furloughs, are
available to modify an unjust sentence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
71. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606 (noting that statutes precluding the
admission of evidence concerning certain mitigating circumstances in capital
cases violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304-05 (invalidating statute that did not permit consideration of relevant factors
pertaining to defendant's character and record or the circumstances of his
offense). But see id. at 604 n.11 (stating that a mandatory death penalty may
be permitted in certain rare types of homicide cases).
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(e)(g) (1995) (stating that, at a capital
sentencing hearing, the state has the burden of proving aggravating factors and
the defense may offer mitigating circumstances).
73. See Lisa R. Duffett, Note, Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence of the
Death Sentence after Sawyer v. Whitley: Another Nail into the Coffin of State
Capital Defendants, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 121, 147-51 (1993) (discussing
states that weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and states that simply
require the sentencing authority to consider mitigating factors). These
sentencing structures are established to insure that "discretion in the area of
sentencing be exercised in an informed manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189 (1976). This process guards against imposing the death penalty
arbitrarily or capriciously. Id.
74. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,405 (1993); Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 9 (1989). In Smith v. Murray, the Court rejected the idea that "the
principles of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the nature of
the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its criminal law." 477 U.S. 527,
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application of the actual innocence exception in capital sentenc-
ing proceedings focuses solely on aggravating circumstances. 75
In Sawyer v. Whitley, the Court held that a petitioner claiming
innocence of a capital sentence must show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that "but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty under the applicable state law."76 To satisfy this test,
a petitioner must show that no aggravating circumstances
existed that would qualify the petitioner for the death pen-
alty.77 Focusing solely on the proof or disproof of aggravating
circumstances confines review to an "obvious class of relevant
evidence."7'
538 (1986). Although the Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of
the capital punishment process, reviewing a federal habeas claim brought well
after trial brings less reliability to the process. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405
(stating that "it is far from clear that a second trial 10 years after the first trial
would produce a more reliable result"). But see Smith, 477 U.S. at 545-46
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has a special obligation to hear
substantial and colorable Eighth Amendment claims to determine if a capital
sentence is fundamentally unfair).
75. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (stating that to be
innocent of a death penalty a petitioner must show that there was "no
aggravating circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility has not
been met"); Kris T. Daniel, Note, Sawyer v. Whitley: The Deadly Game of
Procedures in Death Penalty Cases, 61 UMKC L. REV. 599, 600 (1993) (noting
that the Sawyer majority focused solely on aggravating circumstances).
76. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336. Requiring a constitutional violation is
consistent with the standard used in the context of actual innocence of a crime.
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Herrera case and
the requirement that to gain review a constitutional violation must exist).
Sometimes the petitioner is unable to overcome this burden. See, e.g., Jacobs
v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to rule on petitioner's
eligibility for death penalty because no independent constitutional error
existed).
77. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception focuses solely on aggravating circumstances in capital
sentencing cases).
78. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345. The Sawyer court stated that the actual
innocence exception must be subject to objective factors. Id. at 341. The Court
noted the "regrettable fact" that a judge will only have a limited time to review
the habeas claim because a death-row inmate typically presents a federal
habeas petition challenging a death sentence within a few days of the scheduled
execution. Id. at 341 n.7; see, e.g., Gomez v. United States District Court, 503
U.S. 653, 653-54 (1992) (per curiam) (noting petitioner's attempt to manipulate
system by filing last minute habeas claim); Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 321
(1990) (per curiam) (characterizing petitioner's fourth habeas corpus petition,
which was filed a few days before the scheduled execution, as an "abuse of the
writ"). But see Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654 ("A court may consider the last-minute
nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant
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The Court rejected the argument that federal habeas courts
consider improperly excluded mitigating factors, stating that a
judge cannot reasonably determine a jury's subjective reaction
to those factors." The Court also noted that allowing judges to
subjectively assess a jury's reaction would expand the actual
innocence exception beyond its narrow limits.80 Moreover,
equitable relief.").
79. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345-46. The Sawyer majority noted the wide
variety of mitigating factors that juries are allowed to consider in capital cases.
Id. at 346; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (Burns 1995) (providing a
similar list of mitigating circumstances to be considered); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995) (same); LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN.
art. 905.5 (West 1995) (listing mitigating factors, which include prior criminal
history, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, domination of another, belief
that offense was morally justified, capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct,
youth of offender, level of participation in crime, and any other relevant
mitigating factors).
80. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341 (stating that "we bear in mind that the
exception for 'actual innocence' is a very narrow exception"); see Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) (noting that the actual innocence exception
applies only in extraordinary cases).
Prohibiting petitioners from showing the improper exclusion of certain
mitigating factors at the sentencing stage has drawn criticism. See, e.g.,
Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that neglecting
mitigating circumstances in capital proceedings is "wholly without foundation");
Duffett, supra note 73, at 151 (arguing that the Sawyer standard fails to protect
defendants who are actually innocent of sentences because accurate sentences
cannot be determined if juries lack the complete profiles of defendants'
circumstances); Eric D. Scher, Comment, Sawyer v. Whitley: Stretching the
Boundaries of a Constitutional Death Penalty, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 237, 259
(1993) (arguing that Sawyer contradicts past capital punishment adjudication
and diminishes the heightened reliability requirements in capital proceedings).
Often, the sentencing body in a capital case never hears critical mitigating
evidence because capital defendants do not receive the specialized representa-
tion needed in capital cases. See Scher, supra, at 268 ("Virtually all prisoners
on death row get 'slapdash representation' from court-appointed counsel at trial
and at the direct appeal stage."). The following colloquy illustrates the type of
representation death-row defendants normally receive at the sentencing stage.
After Smith was convicted in his Alabama capital murder trial, the judge asked
his defense counsel if the counsel was ready to proceed with the sentencing
phase. The following exchange took place:
Thomas E. Jones (Defense Counsel): No, sir, we are not.
Court: I hate to send the jury back to a motel another night. What do
you lack being ready?
J. Michael Williams (Defense Counsel): Judge, I haven't even read the
statute about it. All I've been doing is working on this case. As you
recall, we filed numerous motions to continue it, and this is all we've
been working on for the last two weeks.
The judge then recessed until 8:30 the next morning. Fatal Defense, Fatal
Flaws: Learning the Law in Halfa Day, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 36. The
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allowing review of mitigating factors would equate actual
innocence to a simple showing of prejudice, thereby undermining
the cause and prejudice exception because many constitutional
violations already require a showing of prejudice.8
In sum, the extension of the actual innocence exception to
capital sentencing proceedings has been extremely narrow.8 2
Sawyer makes it nearly impossible for a petitioner to succeed on
federal habeas review because the state can show at least one
aggravating circumstance existed in most capital cases.83 In
penalty phase in capital cases is often brief and sometimes involves no
witnesses, opening statement, or cross-examination. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal
Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990,
at 30.
The fact that the overwhelming majority of capital defendants are indigent
helps explain the woefully inadequate representation some capital defendants
receive. See Scher, supra, at 268. Court-appointed counsel is normally
undercompensated, making it difficult for counsel to build a strong defense,
especially in capital litigation which is extremely complex. See, e.g., Fred
Strasser, Fatal Defense: $1,000 Fee Cap Makes Death Row's "Justice" a Bargain
for the State, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 33 (finding that Mississippi gives
court-appointed counsel a maximum of $1,000 to investigate, prepare, and try
capital cases).
81. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345 n.13; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (requiring prejudice for Sixth Amendment ineffective
counsel claim); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982)
(requiring prejudice for a claim that the government deported a witness to make
the witness's testimony unavailable to defense); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 104, 112-13 (1976) (requiring prejudice for claims of prosecutor's failure
to disclose exculpatory information).
82. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329,382
(1995) (stating that the exception has been construed narrowly by holdings that
alleged constitutional violations were insufficient to meet the exception's
requirements despite bearing on the reliability of the evidence, the credibility
of a witness, and the accuracy of the sentence).
83. See, e.g., Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (1995) (finding that
the offense was committed in a heinous, cruel, and depraved manner, an
aggravating circumstance under Arizona law). Most state death penalty
statutes list a number of factors constituting aggravating circumstances. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1996) (listing the following
aggravating circumstances: (1) capital felony committed while under prison
sentence; (2) defendant previously convicted of another capital felony or felony
involving violence; (3) creating great risk of death to many people; (4) capital
felony committed while committing or attempting to commit another serious or
violent felony; (5) capital felony committed to avoid arrest or to escape from
custody; (6) capital felony committed for pecuniary gain; (7) capital felony
committed to disrupt enforcement of laws; (8) an especially cruel capital felony;
(9) capital felony committed in premeditated manner; (10) victim of capital
felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in performance of his official
duties; (11) victim was person less than 12 years old).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1615
addition, a petitioner challenging a capital sentence must satisfy
the "clear and convincing" standard rather than the less onerous
"probably resulted" standard used for claims of innocence of a
crime. 4 The differing standards reflect the reduced procedural
protections at sentencing 5 and the greater injustice that
results from an erroneous conviction as compared to an errone-
ous sentence. 8
B. THE DEBATE OVER EXTENDING THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE
EXCEPTION TO NONCAPITAL CASES
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the actual
innocence exception applies to the sentencing phase of noncapital
trials.8 7 Circuit courts confronting this issue disagree over the
application of the exception to noncapital cases.88 These courts
have either entirely rejected an extension of the actual innocence
exception to noncapital sentencing cases, liberally extended the
exception to noncapital sentencing cases, or narrowly extended
the exception to habitual offender cases.
1. The Fourth Circuit: Expanding the Boundaries of the
Actual Innocence Exception
The Fourth Circuit liberally applied the actual innocence
exception to noncapital sentencing cases in United States v.
Maybeck.89 Maybeck argued that the district court improperly
sentenced him as a career offender because it included an
erroneous charge in calculating his criminal history score under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." Maybeck failed to object
84. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of
the "clear and convincing" standard in capital sentencing proceedings and the
"probably resulted" standard in cases involving a claim of innocence of a crime).
85. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (stating that
it is "necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules
of evidence properly applicable to the trial").
86. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 n.44 (1995).
87. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 1995).
88. Id. (noting that "It~he other circuits appear to be split on this issue").
89. 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 891. The government and Maybeck negotiated a plea agreement
in which Maybeck pleaded guilty to certain charges in exchange for the
government dismissing the other charges. Id. at 890. The agreement
incorrectly stated that Maybeck was a career offender and he had a criminal
history category of VI under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). Id. at
890-91 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). Based on this information, the district court
sentenced Maybeck to 198 months. Id. at 891.
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to his sentence or appeal the sentence, thus constituting a proce-
dural default of his claim.9' On federal habeas review, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the sentence, finding Maybeck actually
innocent of being a career offender under the Guidelines.92
Surprisingly, the court did not rely on any constitutional
violation in applying the actual innocence exception.93
2. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits: Attempting to
Remain Within the Narrow Confines of the Actual
Innocence Exception
The Fifth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, that the
actual innocence exception extends to noncapital sentencing
cases.94 This circuit applies the strict Sawyer standard to
challenges of a noncapital sentence.95 A petitioner must show
"but for the constitutional error, [petitioner] would not have been
legally eligible for the sentence [petitioner] received."96 There-
fore, even if a petitioner is improperly sentenced under a
habitual offender statute, redress is unavailable if the same
sentence could have been imposed under the normal statutory
sentencing range.97 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, a petitioner
must also allege and prove a constitutional violation.9"
91. Id. The procedural default in Maybeck occurred at the federal level
rather than the state level, thus implicating costs less than those normally
associated with reviewing procedurally defaulted claims. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text (discussing the costs of reviewing procedurally defaulted
state claims).
92. Id. at 892 (stating that "[tihere is no question... Maybeck is actually
innocent of being a career offender"). The court stated that the actual innocence
exception logically applies to noncapital enhancement cases. Id. at 893.
93. See Sean L. Dalton, Carved in Sand:Actual Innocence in United States
v. Maybeck, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2388, 2404-05 (1995) (noting that no constitutional
violation was explicitly identified in Maybeck). Maybeck did allege that his
guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, but the court never
addressed this issue. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891.
94. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v.
Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1992).
95. See Smith, 977 F.2d at 959 ("[We are convinced that actual innocence
in a non-capital sentencing case can be no less stringent than the Supreme
Court's formulation of actual innocence in capital sentencing.").
96. Id.
97. See id. (finding that the defendant, sentenced as an habitual offender,
could not demonstrate actual innocence because he was eligible for the same
sentence even if he had not been sentenced as an habitual offender).
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourth
Circuit's actual innocence approach in Maybeck did not require a constitutional
violation).
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The Seventh Circuit considered extending the actual
innocence exception to noncapital sentences in Mills v. Jor-
dan.99 In Mills, the petitioner claimed he was innocent of being
a habitual offender because a prior conviction was constitu-
tionally defective.'0 0 The Seventh Circuit found that the
similarities between habitual offender and capital sentencing
proceedings warranted an extension of the actual innocence
exception to habitual offender cases."' In evaluating the
petitioner's claim, the Mills court concluded that the petitioner
could not show he was actually innocent of being a habitual
offender.'12 Without explicitly adopting the strict Sawyer
standard, the Seventh Circuit implied that it evaluates
noncapital sentencing cases under the Sawyer standard.10 3
In Jones v. Arkansas,04 the Eighth Circuit found the
petitioner actually innocent of a sentence received pursuant to
a habitual offender statute, °5 despite his eligibility for the
same sentence under normal sentencing guidelines.' After
99. 979 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1992).
100. Id. at 1275. Mills received a two-year sentence that was increased by
30 years under Indiana's habitual offender statute requiring two prior unrelated
felonies. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1995). In his federal habeas
appeal, Mills argued that one of his prior felony convictions was constitutionally
defective due to ineffective counsel and a lack of a knowing and intelligent plea.
Mills, 979 F.2d at 1275. This conviction was used in finding Mills a habitual
offender. Id.
101. Id. at 1279. The court noted that habitual offender and capital
sentencing proceedings are similar because they are determined by a decision
of factual guilt or innocence, and both look to whether a petitioner is innocent
of the factors justifying the sentence rather than innocent of the actual crime.
Id. at 1278-79.
102. Id. at 1279. The court noted that the record demonstrated that Mills
had a number of other previous felonies and he admitted he was guilty of these
offenses at the sentencing stage. Id. In addition, Mills' argument that the prior
conviction was unconstitutional was a claim of legal innocence rather than
actual innocence. Id.; ef Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992)
(stating that the actual innocence exception deals with actual rather than legal
innocence claims); Boyer v. United States, 55 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1995)
("[Cilaims of legal innocence rather than claims of actual innocence have no
relevance in the miscarriage of justice context.").
103. See Mills, 979 F.2d at 1278-79 (noting the similarities between Mills
and Sawyer); see also Dalton, supra note 93, at 2401 (explaining that the
petitioner in Mills was unable to show actual innocence because the court relied
on the stringent standard of Sawyer).
104. 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991).
105. Id. at 381.
106. See id. at 379 (recognizing that the habitual offender statute and the
general statutory guidelines both allowed sentences of life imprisonment).
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Sawyer, the Eighth Circuit has questioned the continuing
validity of Jones.0 7 Most recently, the Eighth Circuit noted
that applying the Sawyer standard to noncapital cases "raises
perplexing questions.""0 8 The court stated that the language
in Sawyer supported the view that Jones was still good law'0 9
despite other language in Sawyer indicating that the actual
innocence exception did not apply to noncapital sentencing
cases"0° or, at a minimum, a petitioner could only be innocent
of a noncapital sentence if the sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum."' The Eighth Circuit, however, refrained from
overruling Jones."
3. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits: Rejecting an Extension of
the Actual Innocence Exception
The Tenth Circuit refused to extend the actual innocence
exception to noncapital cases in United States v. Richards."3
Richards claimed that the district court miscalculated his
sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, an issue he
raised in a previous federal habeas petition." The Tenth
Circuit refused to consider the claim, stating that "[a] person
cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence." 15 In
Selsor v. Kaiser,"6 however, the Tenth Circuit appeared to
endorse the actual innocence exception in habitual offender
107. See Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that
after Sawyer, it is unclear whether Jones is still good law in noncapital cases).
In Smith v. Collins, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply Jones, stating that "[w]e
are convinced the Eighth Circuit's inquiry has been effectively superseded by
Sawyer." 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1992).
108. Waring v. Delo, 7 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1993).
109. Id. (noting that Sawyer cited Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1981),
for the proposition that the actual innocence exception seeks to correct
fundamentally unjust incarcerations). Sawyer also cited Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 539 (1986), for the proposition that a fundamentally unjust incarcera-
tion included a claim that an alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt
or sentencing determination. Waring, 7 F.3d at 757.
110. See Waring, 7 F.3d at 757 (noting the Court's recognition that the
concept of actual innocence is easy to grasp in noncapital cases, implying that
the exception does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 758.
113. 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
114. Id. at 1370. Richards claimed the district court improperly included the
"weight of unmarketable and unusable waste water along with the weight of
extractable methamphetamine in determining the base offense level." Id.
115. Id. at 1371.
116. 22 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 1994).
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cases. The court stated: "In a habitual offender case, the
petitioner is actually innocent of the sentence if he can show he
is innocent of the fact-i.e., the prior conviction-necessary to
sentence him as an habitual offender."" 7 Surprisingly, neither
the majority nor the dissent in Selsor cited Richards in discuss-
ing the actual innocence exception in noncapital sentencing
cases.
In two unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit cited
Richards in rejecting an extension of the actual innocence
standard to noncapital sentences." 8 Both of these cases also
cited United States v. Flores,"9 a Fifth Circuit case, for the
proposition that the actual innocence exception is inapplicable to
noncapital sentencing cases.2 The Fifth Circuit's most recent
discussion on the actual innocence exception in noncapital cases,
however, assumed that the exception applied in this context.' 2 '
III. ANALYZING THE EXTENSION OF THE ACTUAL
INNOCENCE EXCEPTION TO NONCAPITAL
SENTENCING CASES
A. THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: Is AN EXTENSION
WARRANTED?
As the Eighth Circuit noted,'22 Sawyer v. Whitley provides
persuasive support for the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the actualinnocence exception in noncapital sentencing cases.'" In
discussing the meaning of actual innocence, the Sawyer Court
described the epitome of actual innocence as convicting the
wrong person of a crime.124 The Court went on to state, "[i]n
the context of a noncapital case, the concept of 'actual innocence'
117. Id. at 1036 (citing Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992)).
118. Flahardy v. United States, No. 95-5281, 1995 WL 570925, at *2 (6th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1995); Black v. United States, No. 95-5041, 1995 WL 445718, at
*2 (6th Cir. July 26, 1995).
119. 981 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
120. Flahardy, 1995 WL 570925 at *2; Black, 1995 WL 445718 at *2.
121. See Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 1995) (assuming
without deciding that the actual innocence exception applies to noncapital
sentencing cases).
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception may not apply to noncapital sentencing cases).
123. See United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Sawyer explained that in a noncapital case actual innocence
simply means the defendant did not commit the crime).
124. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992).
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is easy to grasp."'25 The Court noted the difficulty in applying
the actual innocence exception to a capital sentence, but stated
that "we must strive to construct an analog to the simpler
situation represented by the case of a noncapital defendant."'26
This discussion implies that a noncapital case provides a
"simpler situation" because the actual innocence exception
applies only to the guilt-or-innocence phase of noncapital
proceedings,'27 while a capital case is more problematic be-
cause the actual innocence exception applies at the guilt-or-
innocence stage and at the sentencing stage.'
28
Conversely, the Court's statements in Smith v. Murray
29
imply that the actual innocence exception applies to noncapital
sentencing proceedings.' In extending the actual innocence
exception to capital sentencing proceedings, the Court stated
that procedural default principles do not depend on the nature
of the penalty imposed.'' In addition, the Court stated that
it is fair to enforce procedural default rules in a case lacking a
"substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the
accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination."3 2 The
Supreme Court also consistently has held that the death penalty
does not mandate a higher standard of review on federal habeas
corpus appeal.' Thus it follows that the Court overcame the
barrier to extending review to noncapital sentencing cases when
it extended the exception to capital sentencing cases because
capital and noncapital cases are treated alike on federal habeas
review. 134
Because the Supreme Court's cases fail to resolve the issue,
it is important to weigh the costs and benefits of extending the
125. Id. at 341.
126. Id.
127. Waring, 7 F.3d at 757 (stating that Sawyer "suggests that there maybe
no exception for procedurally barred noncapital sentencing claims, unless one
is innocent of the crime").
128. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 340-47 (applying the actual innocence exception
to capital sentencing case).
129. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
130. See Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.16 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
Smith and stating that "there are indications that the actual innocence
exception also may apply to non-capital sentencing").
131. Smith, 477 U.S at 538.
132. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
133. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that the death
penalty does not require heightened scrutiny on federal habeas review).
134. See supra notes 75-78, 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
extension of the actual innocence exception to capital sentencing proceedings).
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actual innocence exception to noncapital cases. In general,
federal habeas corpus review places high costs on society, the
accused, the judicial system, and our federal system.135 Allow-
ing federal habeas review of successive, abusive, and proce-
durally defaulted claims further increases these costs. 13 6
Furthermore, extending the actual innocence exception to all
noncapital sentencing cases threatens to expand the exception
beyond its narrow limits. 37 Courts reviewing most noncapital
sentencing proceedings cannot focus on "a relatively obvious
class of relevant evidence" 138 because noncapital cases normally
do not involve a separate sentencing stage resembling the guilt-
or-innocence stage, and a number of factors determine the
sentencing range.3 9 In a capital sentencing case, the sentenc-
ing stage develops specific findings of facts, which a reviewing
court examines to determine whether a petitioner is eligible for
the death penalty.40 The existence of any aggravating circum-
stance establishes eligibility for a death sentence. 4' Unlike
capital cases, eligibility for a noncapital sentence is determined
by a number of factors.' Examining each factor and assess-
ing its weight on the sentencing decision is incompatible with
the premise that review must focus on an obvious class of
relevant evidence.'
Extending the actual innocence exception, however, benefits
society, the judicial system, and the accused by correcting
135. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of federal
habeas review).
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing costs associated
with reviewing procedurally defaulted claims).
137. See supra notes 56, 78, 80, 82-86 and accompanying text (noting the
narrow scope of the actual innocence exception).
138. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992); see also supra notes 79-81
and accompanying text (stating that extending review to mitigating factors in
capital cases is inappropriate).
139. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
140. See, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348 (finding that the jury found two
aggravating factors at the sentencing stage).
141. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West 1996) (stating that
a death sentence shall not be imposed unless the jury finds the existence of at
least one aggravating circumstance at the sentencing hearing).
142. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (noting factors used in
determining a sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
143. See supra notes 56, 78, 80, 82-86 and accompanying text (noting the
narrow limits of the actual innocence exception).
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fundamentally unjust incarcerations.' Although not all
incorrect sentences constitute fundamentally unjust sen-
tences, 4 ' habitual offender statutes that punish more severely
based on previous convictions create the potential for a funda-
mentally unjust incarceration. 4 6 In habitual offender cases,
an extension is appropriate because the benefits of correcting
such unjust sentences outweigh the relatively small costs
associated with reviewing habitual offender sentences.
47
Habitual offender statutes typically provide a separate sentenc-
ing stage, resembling the guilt-or-innocence stage, in which the
state must prove that the defendant committed a certain number
of prior offenses. 4  This procedure develops objective facts,
including the number of prior offenses proved, which a court can
review easily when evaluating a petitioner's claim of inno-
cence.
149
B. ADOPTING THE STRICT SAWYER STANDARD IN NONCAPITAL
SENTENCING CASES
Remaining mindful of the costs and benefits, as well as the
narrow scope of the actual innocence exception, this Note argues
that an extension of the exception is warranted in the small
group of cases in which a petitioner: (1) is sentenced under a
procedure resembling the guilt-or-innocence stage; (2) alleges
and proves that a constitutional violation resulted in the
sentence; (3) demonstrates innocence of the sentence by clear
and convincing evidence; and (4) proves that the sentence
received exceeded the maximum permitted under the applicable
statute. This test mirrors the Fifth Circuit's approach requiring
144. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that principles of
comity and finality must yield to correct incarcerations that are fundamentally
unjust).
145. See Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding
that a misapplication of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines did not constitute
a miscarriage of justice).
146. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 1996) (providing for a
sentence up to three times as long as the sentence for an underlying offense if
the defendant is an habitual offender).
147. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.16 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that
enforcing the procedural default rule in petitioner's challenge to the habitual
offender sentence would create "manifest injustice").
148. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-502 (1995) (establishing a separate
sentencing proceeding for determining the number of prior felonies).
149. See, e.g., Jones, 929 F.2d at 377 (noting that the state proved two prior
felonies at the sentencing stage of the habitual offender proceeding).
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that a petitioner prove "that but for the constitutional error
[petitioner] would not have been legally eligible for the sentence
[petitioner] received."150
This test is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
concerning the actual innocence exception and it recognizes the
proper role of federal habeas courts. Requiring that a petitioner
receive a sentence pursuant to a separate sentencing proceeding
resembling the guilt-or-innocence stage complies with the actual
innocence exception's narrow scope and ensures that a
petitioner's claim is subject to determination by objective
factors.'' Reviewing courts simply decide whether the state
proved the requisite facts at the sentencing stage. 152 Requiring
that a petitioner's sentence exceed the statutory maximum
adopts Sawyer's "no reasonable juror" standard and forces
reviewing courts to remain focused on objective factors in
assessing a sentencing authority's reaction in the absence of the
alleged constitutional violation.'53 Forcing a petitioner to
allege and prove a constitutional violation reaffirms the purpose
of federal habeas corpus review-to ensure that people are not
incarcerated in violation of the Constitution.' Finally, em-
ploying Sawyer's "clear and convincing" standard to noncapital
sentences complies with Schiup v. Delo,1' in which the Court
noted that this standard applies to claims of innocence of a
sentence.' 6
To date, no case exemplifies the characteristics needed to
150. Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1992).
151. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception is a narrow exception and, therefore, review must be
limited to objective factors).
152. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
analysis in Mills v. Jordan).
153. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting that Sawyer rejected
the argument that review should extend to mitigating circumstances in capital
cases because it is too difficult to assess how jurors would react to additional
mitigating circumstances).
154. See supra notes 23, 25, 61 and accompanying text (explaining the role
of federal habeas courts); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05
(1993) (requiring a constitutional violation).
155. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
156. Id. at 867 n.44. In Schlup, the Court held that a petitioner claiming
innocence of a crime must show that a constitutional violation "probably
resulted" in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. at 867; see also
supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the different standards
applied to claims of innocence of a crime and innocence of a sentence).
1638
ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
satisfy the test advocated in this Note."' Combining the facts
of Jones and Mills, however, presents a scenario that satisfies
this test. The petitioner in Jones received a bifurcated trial,
demonstrated that a constitutional violation resulted in the
determination that he was a habitual offender, and proved by
clear and convincing evidence that he was ineligible for sentenc-
ing as a habitual offender because he lacked the requisite
number of prior offenses. 5 ' The petitioner in Jones, however,
could not satisfy the fourth prong of the test because his
sentence was within the sentencing range of the applicable
statute.'59 If the petitioner in Mills had proven he lacked the
requisite number of prior convictions, he would have satisfied
the fourth prong of the test. 60 The applicable auto theft
statute in Mills allowed a maximum sentence of three years.'6 '
The petitioner in Mills, however, received a sentence of thirty-
two years based on a thirty-year sentence enhancement for being
a habitual offender.'62
C. REJECTING THE MORE EXPANSIVE MODEL
1. The Fourth Circuit: An Impermissible Extension of the
Actual Innocence Exception
The Fourth Circuit's application of the actual innocence
exception in noncapital sentencing cases represents the most
expansive application of the exception. In United States v.
Maybeck,6 the Fourth Circuit extended the actual innocence
exception beyond the boundaries delineated in Sawyer."M
First, the court did not rely on a constitutional violation,
157. The Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner in Jones satisfied the actual
innocence standard, but applying the Sawyer standard to Jones would result in
the petitioner failing to show actual innocence. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text (noting the Fifth Circuit's discussion in Jones).
158. See supra notes 9, 13 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
Jones).
159. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir. 1991).
160. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
Mills).
161. The applicable Indiana auto theft statute involved a Class D felony.
IND. CODE § 35-43-4-2 (1995). A Class D felony carries a fixed term of one and
one-half years, with the possibility of an additional one and one-half years for
aggravating circumstances. Id. § 35-50-2-7.
162. Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1992).
163. 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994).
164. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (explaining the strict test
Sawyer established for claims of actual innocence in capital sentencing cases).
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ignoring the fact that the purpose of federal habeas review is to
prevent incarceration in violation of the Constitution.
165
Second, the court applied the exception to a challenge of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a procedure that prevents a
reviewing court from focusing on objective factors when applying
the actual innocence exception. 166  The federal nature of
Maybeck best explains the expansive use of the actual innocence
exception, 67 but its breadth contradicts the exception's narrow
scope.
a. Requiring Petitioners to Prove a Constitutional Violation
Formulating a valid constitutional claim is often a difficult
task for federal habeas petitioners challenging a noncapital
sentence. Petitioners cannot rely on constitutional defects in
prior convictions because that amounts to a claim of legal
innocence, and the Sawyer standard requires petitioners to prove
factual innocence. 61 In habitual offender cases, this means a
petitioner must prove factual innocence of the number of prior
convictions needed for eligibility as a habitual offender.
169
Petitioners demonstrating factual innocence of prior felonies
used to sentence them as habitual offenders usually point to
obvious defects. For example, in Jones, the state proved that the
petitioner had two prior felony convictions, but the applicable
habitual offender statute required three prior felonies. 7' In
Jones, a constitutional violation was readily available,' 7 ' in
contrast to the majority of federal habeas cases where peti-
165. See supra notes 23, 25, 61 and accompanying text (explaining the role
of federal habeas courts).
166. See Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890-91 (noting that petitioner received his
sentence based on the level of the offense and the criminal history score
stipulated to by the parties and prepared by the petitioner's probation officer).
167. See Dalton, supra note 93, at 2401 ("The ease with which the court in
Maybeck chose to employ the actual innocence exception ... may best be
explained by the purely federal nature of the case."). Federal cases do not
present the same types of costs that are implicated when a federal habeas court
reviews a state decision or a procedurally defaulted state claim. See supra
notes 31, 36 and accompanying text (noting the high costs of reviewing state
decisions and procedurally defaulted state claims).
168. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (noting that the actual
innocence exception is concerned with factual rather than legal innocence).
169. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that the petitioner
in Mills could not prove factual innocence of his previous convictions).
170. See supra note 9 (discussing Jones).
171. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that petitioner's
sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution).
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tioners struggle to find an error that rises to the level of a
constitutional violation.
72
Generally, petitioners must argue ineffectiveness of counsel
as the constitutional violation. 173 The problem with the inef-
fective counsel argument is that it has been implicitly rejected
by the time the court analyzes the actual innocence exception.
In cases of successive, abusive, or defaulted claims, courts only
apply the actual innocence exception if petitioners fail to satisfy
the cause and prejudice standard. 74 A successful ineffective
counsel claim satisfies the "cause" prong of this test. 75 It also
implicitly satisfies the "prejudice" prong because a successful
ineffective counsel claim requires a showing of prejudice.176 If
the petitioner's ineffective counsel claim satisfies the cause and
prejudice standard, the court will never reach the actual
innocence exception. 77 Courts reaching the actual innocence
exception, therefore, have already rejected a petitioner's
ineffective counsel claim by finding that the petitioner did not
satisfy the. cause and prejudice exception.178
Petitioners also cannot rely on a sentencing error as a
constitutional violation because noncapital sentencing errors
normally do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
179
The Court in Herrera left open the question whether a truly
persuasive showing of actual innocence in a capital case allows
a petitioner to gain relief despite the lack of a valid constitu-
tional claim. 8' The possibility that a truly persuasive showing
of actual innocence of a capital crime would render an execution
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173-184 (noting the problems
petitioners experience in formulating valid constitutional claims).
173. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining that
procedural defaults generally result from attorney error).
174. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception is an exception to the cause and prejudice standard).
175. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that ineffective
counsel satisfies the "cause" prong).
176. See supra notes 47, 51 and accompanying text (discussing the
Strickland standard for ineffective counsel claims and the prejudice require-
ment).
177. See supra notes 53-55 (noting that courts only reach the actual
innocence exception if petitioners fail to satisfy the cause and prejudice
exception).
178. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that valid
ineffective counsel claims satisfy the cause and prejudice standard).
179. See infra text accompanying note 184 (quoting Higgins).
180. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the Herrera
opinion).
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unconstitutional is grounded in the Eighth Amendment's right
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process guarantees.'' In this context, the
execution of a petitioner showing innocence of a crime consti-
tutes a constitutional violation in itself.12  This exception
logically extends to capital sentencing proceedings in which the
petitioner proves ineligibility for the death penalty.183 Extend-
ing this analysis to noncapital sentencing cases, however, is
inappropriate because, as the Eighth Circuit stated:
If we were to hold that the [sentencing] mistake complained of here
was a constitutional one, say because it violates due process to
incarcerate a person beyond his term, or offends the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to do so, then there would be no
effective boundaries to habeas inquiries. T8
Applying the actual innocence exception in the absence of a
constitutional violation is appealing in noncapital sentencing
cases because requiring a constitutional violation creates
increased problems. In a case where a petitioner claims to be
innocent of a crime and supplements the claim with an alleged
constitutional error, an anomalous result could occur if the
petitioner presents evidence of probable innocence, but remains
incarcerated because the court finds the constitutional claim
meritless.'85
The Supreme Court believes that executive clemency will
remedy these situations;5 6 however, relying on executive
clemency in noncapital sentencing cases is misguided because
executive clemency focuses mainly on preventing executions of
innocent people.' 87 Petitioners demonstrating actual innocence
181. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
182. See id. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (implying that the constitution
does not permit the execution of an innocent person).
183. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
heightened reliability that death penalty cases require because of the nature of
the penalty).
184. Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1993).
185. See supra note 60 (noting that the possibility of an innocent prisoner
remaining incarcerated because no constitutional violation existed drew large
public criticism).
186. See supra note 60 (discussing the availability of executive clemency in
cases involving strong showings of innocence).
187. See Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There Is Nothing Certain Like Death
in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row
Inmates' Last Appeals, 37 ARIz L. REv. 375, 398 (1995) ("Without question,
executive clemency exists to prevent the execution of innocent people. A state
that in practice abolishes executive clemency increases the risk that innocent
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of noncapital sentences by clear and convincing evidence are
unlikely to receive a pardon because no threat of executing an
innocent person exists. 88 Therefore, a petitioner proving
innocence of a noncapital sentence but failing to prove a
constitutional violation is less likely to receive redress than a
petitioner proving innocence of a capital crime or capital
sentence. 189
Although forcing a petitioner to prove a constitutional
violation despite making a persuasive showing of innocence is
questionable, 90 it conforms to the federal habeas court's role
of correcting constitutional errors rather than errors of fact.'
The Fourth Circuit's failure to rely on a constitutional violation
ignores this role and impermissibly expands the actual innocence
exception beyond its narrow limits.' 92
b. Limiting Review to Objective Factors: Rejecting an
Extension to Guideline Sentences
Applying the actual innocence exception to noncapital
sentences promulgated under sentencing guidelines is problem-
atic because reviewing courts evaluating the propriety of a
guideline sentence cannot focus on objective factors.'93 Courts
cannot focus on objective factors because sentencing under
guidelines does not involve a separate sentencing stage resem-
bling the guilt-or-innocence stage,' a number of factors
people will be executed.").
188. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (stating that executive
clemency focuses on preventing the execution of innocent persons).
189. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the petitioner was mistakenly sentenced, but no redress was available
because the petitioner did not point to any constitutional violation).
190. See Steiker, supra note 46, at 377 ("It is difficult to imagine that a
federal habeas court could sensibly conclude that a petitioner is probably
innocent and that relief is nonetheless inappropriate.").
191. See supra notes 23, 25, 61 and accompanying text (explaining the role
of federal habeas courts).
192. See supra notes 56, 78, 80, 82-86 and accompanying text (noting the
narrow limits of the actual innocence exception).
193. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception must focus on objective factors for it to operate properly).
194. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES § 6A1.1 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (stating that a presentence
investigation and report are to be submitted to the court before imposition of a
sentence).
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determine the sentencing range,'95 and the sentencing authority
possesses discretion at sentencing.196  Allowing courts to
review guideline sentences under these conditions unduly
broadens the actual innocence exception beyond its narrow
limits.
97
In capital sentencing cases, a separate sentencing stage
requires the state to prove the existence of aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt.'98 Similarly, in habitual
offender sentencing, the state must prove the requisite number
of prior offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 These sentenc-
ing procedures develop facts and provide a reliable record for a
court to review.200  Unlike these proceedings, sentencing
guidelines normally do not involve a separate stage in which the
prosecution must prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a
separate sentencing hearing in which the prosecution must prove
disputed facts by a preponderance of the evidence.20 ' This
procedure is less formal than capital sentencing procedures
because a probation officer prepares the sentencing report2 2
and the defendant challenges any disputed information in the
report at the sentencing hearing.23 As a result, reviewing
courts encounter a less reliable record when determining a
petitioner's eligibility for the sentence received.0 4
Guideline sentences create further problems because a
195. See, e.g., United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the sentencing court relied on the defendant's offense level and
criminal history category to determine a guideline range of 168-210 months
before imposing a sentence of 198 months).
196. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (statingthat sentencing courts can depart from the
guideline range if aggravating circumstances exist).
197. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (noting that the actual
innocence exception is a narrow exception to the cause and prejudice standard).
198. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West 1996) (stating that
a death sentence shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance at the sentencing
hearing).
199. See supra note 146 (citing Indiana's habitual offender statute).
200. See supra notes 9, 140 (discussing the sentencing phases in Jones and
Sawyer).
201. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)(b).
202. Id. § 6Al.1.
203. Id. § 6A1.3(a).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1994)
(noting that defendant's criminal history worksheet incorrectly indicated that
he was a career offender).
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number of factors determine the appropriate sentence. Typically,
a guideline sentence is determined by a defendant's criminal
history score and the offense level of the crime charged. °5
Both of these factors are calculated based on a combination of
other factors.2" Allowing a reviewing court to evaluate each
factor to determine the propriety of the sentence is inappropriate
because review must focus on a "relatively obvious class of
relevant evidence."0 '
Furthermore, the sentencing judge's discretion to depart
from the recommended guideline sentence creates difficulties
when applying Sawyer's "no reasonable juror" standard. 08 For
example, the petitioner in Maybeck received a 198-month
sentence based on the improper finding that he was a career
offender under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.0 9 The
correct guideline range permitted a maximum sentence of 165
months.210 In holding that the petitioner was actually inno-
cent of the sentence,2" the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize
the possibility that the sentencing authority could depart
upward from the Guidelines.2" Furthermore, because judges
may depart, or decide not to depart, from the Guidelines for
different reasons, it is impossible for a reviewing court to
determine how an individual judge would sentence based on a
certain set of facts.213 Applying the actual innocence exception
in these situations is improper because it forces reviewing courts
to subjectively assess the reactions of sentencing authorities.214
205. See U.S.S.G. § 5A (providing sentencing table).
206. See id. §§ 4Al, 4B1.1, 4B1.4(c) (describing the factors used to calculate
criminal history scores). See generally id. chs. 2-3 (discussing the factors used
to calculate offense level).
207. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992).
208. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth
Circuit's requirement that petitioners show they were legally ineligible for the
sentence received).
209. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1994).
210. Id. at 894.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that judges possess
the discretionary power to depart from the Guidelines).
213. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.1-5K2.16 (providing numerous factors on which a
judge may rely in departing from the Guidelines).
214. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the actual
innocence exception must focus on objective factors).
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2. The Eighth Circuit's Approach: Violating the
"No Reasonable Juror" Standard
The Eighth Circuit's approach in Jones, applying the actual
innocence exception to habitual offender cases even if the
sentence received was available under the general felony statute,
is arguably more appropriate than applying Sawyer's "no
reasonable juror" standard because of the differences between
capital sentencing and habitual offender sentencing.215 Capital
cases subject a defendant to death, a penalty not available under
normal statutory sentencing guidelines.216 In habitual offender
cases, however, a defendant may be eligible for the same
maximum sentence under either the habitual offender statute or
the general sentencing statute.217 Although the maximum
penalties may be the same, the habitual offender statute's
harsher options may influence a juror to sentence a defendant
more severely.218
Requiring a habitual offender sentence to exceed the
statutory maximum, however, ensures that the actual innocence
exception remains narrowly tailored.219 The Court's belief that
the death penalty does not require a different standard of review
on federal habeas review implies that the "no reasonable juror"
215. Although two Eighth Circuit cases questioned the holding in Jones, the
court in neither case overruled Jones. See supra notes 107-12 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the possibility that Jones is not good law).
216. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that a defendant will
receive life imprisonment unless the state proves aggravating factors at the
sentencing stage).
217. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that the
petitioner in Jones could have received a life sentence under either the habitual
offender statute or the general felony statute).
218. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1991). Jones sought to
alleviate this prejudice, and Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), supported
this approach. In Hicks, the Supreme Court ruled that sentencing a defendant
to a mandatory 40-year term under a habitual offender statute without jury
discretion violated his due process rights, even though the sentence was within
the range available under the proper statute. Id. at 346. Hicks, however,
addressed this argument on direct appeal. Id. at 345. Sawyer's strict "no
reasonable juror" standard appears to supersede Hicks in federal habeas cases.
See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (noting the problems associated
with reviewing procedurally defaulted claims and examining the higher
standard of review used on federal habeas appeal).
219. See Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959-60 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992)
(suggesting that the actual innocence exception is concerned with the propriety
of sentences received rather than the propriety of methods used to sentence).
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standard applies to both capital and noncapital sentences.22 °
Allowing petitioners to challenge habitual offender sentences
falling within the sentencing range of a general felony statute
contradicts the reasoning behind the "no reasonable juror"
standard because a reasonable juror could sentence the defen-
dant to the same penalty without relying on the habitual
offender options.22' Allowing federal judges to assess how
jurors would react to the sentencing range of a general felony
statute impermissibly broadens the actual innocence exception
because it shifts the focus of a reviewing court from objective to
subjective factors.222
CONCLUSION
The actual innocence exception provides a safety valve for
federal habeas petitioners bringing successive, abusive, or
procedurally defaulted claims. The Supreme Court's decisions
in Sawyer and Herrera that strictly limit the ability of peti-
tioners to demonstrate "actual innocence" of a crime or death
sentence, however, create the impression that the exception is a
roadblock rather than a safety valve. The high costs of federal
habeas corpus review combined with the additional costs of
reviewing successive, abusive, and procedurally defaulted claims
require courts to place these limits on the use of the actual
innocence exception.
This Note recognizes the strict limits associated with the
actual innocence exception and proceeds to weigh the costs of
habeas review against the benefits of extending the exception to
noncapital sentencing cases. The Note concludes that the
exception should extend to the narrow class of cases in which a
petitioner receives a sentence in a separate sentencing procedure
resembling the guilt-or-innocence stage, demonstrates that a
constitutional violation resulted in the sentence, proves inno-
cence of the sentence by clear and convincing evidence, and
shows that the sentence received exceeded the statutory
maximum. This test benefits petitioners serving sentences that
are fundamentally unjust, such as incorrect habitual offender
220. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
221. See Smith, 977 F.2d at 959-60 n.5 ("[Aipplying the actual innocence test
of Sawyer to the facts of Jones supports the conclusion that Jones had not
demonstrated actual innocence because even absent the constitutional error, a
reasonable juror could still have found Jones eligible for life imprisonment.").
222. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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sentences, because it provides an avenue for these petitioners to
challenge their sentences. Conversely, the costs of this narrow
extension are low in that review is limited to objective factors.
This test complies with the Supreme Court's admonition that the
actual innocence exception is a narrow exception.
